We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budgetadditive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have attracted a lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every ε > 0, our algorithm obtains a (2.404 + ε)-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental problems in markets is to allocate a heterogeneous set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation for the received items. Over the last decades, variants of this problem have attracted an enormous amount of research interest in economics, computer science, and operations research. The problem captures basic assignment tasks that arise in many applications, e.g., when assigning goods to customers in online markets or resources to users in computer networks. The predominant approach in algorithmic research concerns optimization of social welfare: Allocate items to maximize the sum of valuations. Over the last two decades, a rich understanding of algorithms for optimizing and approximating social welfare has been derived (e.g., [10, 22, 23, 26, 31, 35, 46] and many more).
Social welfare follows a utilitarian approach to aggregate the valuations of agents, and it has several drawbacks. Most prominently, social welfare tends to assign items only to the agents with high numerical values, and as such can determine a highly unfair allocation. Towards this end, several works have started to consider an egalitarian approach by optimization of max-min fairness: Allocate items to maximize the minimum of valuations. For a restricted variant of additive valuations (termed the Santa Claus problem) there has been significant progress in terms of improved approximation algorithms (e.g., [4, 5, 7, 14, 29] and more).
Social welfare and max-min fairness represent two extremes on a spectrum of aggregation methods. While social welfare tends to focus only on highest-valued agents, max-min fairness tends to focus only on the smallest-valued agent. An interesting trade-off between these extremal objectives is the Nash social welfare: Allocate items to maximize the geometric mean of valuations. It has been proposed in the classic game theory literature by Nash [37] when solving the bargaining problem. It is closely related to the notion of proportional fairness studied in networking [30] -in contrast to both social welfare and max-min fairness it is invariant to individual scaling of each agent valuation with a possibly different constant factor. Moreover, for divisible items the optimal Nash social welfare is achieved via the classic fairness notion of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [36] .
The algorithmic problem of allocating indivisible items to maximize the Nash social welfare is far from being well-understood. Only recently, it has started to attract significant research interest in the literature on approximation algorithms. The problem is known to be NP- [38] and APX-hard [32] , even for additive valuations. As a remarkable result, Cole and Gkatzelis [18] gave the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for additive valuations, where the constant was recently improved to 2 [17] . Constant-factor approximation algorithms for additive valuations can also be obtained using methods from the domain of stable polynomials [1] . Moreover, these algorithms have been extended to provide a 2-approximation in multi-unit markets with agent valuations, which remain additive-separable over items [9] , but might be concave in the number of copies received for each item [2] .
In this paper, we provide the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the maximum Nash social welfare in markets with a class of non-separable submodular valuation functions. In particular, we show how to obtain in polynomial time a (2e 1/(2e) + ε)-approximation for budget-additive valuation functions, for any constant ε > 0. These valuations are given by non-negative numbers v ij ≥ 0 for every agent i and item j, as well as a utility cap c i > 0 for every agent i. The valuation of agent i for any subset S of items is v i (S) = min(c i , j∈S v ij ).
The analysis of budget-additive valuations significantly advances our understanding beyond additiveseparable and towards submodular ones. The handling of non-separability requires several new insights and techniques that we explain in detail below. Moreover, budget-additive valuations are of interest in a variety of applications, most prominently in online advertising [33, 34] . They have been studied frequently in the literature, e.g., for offline social welfare maximization [3, 6, 15, 43] , online algorithms [11, 20] , mechanism design [12] , Walrasian equilibrium [27, 41] , and market equilibrium [8, 17] .
Contribution and Techniques
Our main contribution is the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations. We obtain an approximation factor of (2e 1/(2e) + ε) in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0. We also show a lower bound of 8/7 > 1.069 for approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations, unless P=NP. The best previous result was a lower bound of 1.00008 derived for additive valuations [32] .
In contrast to the approaches based on stable polynomials [1, 2] , our algorithm relies on relaxing the problem to a class of Fisher markets and then rounding an equilibrium allocation to an integral assignment. Conceptually, this appears similar to the algorithm by Cole and Gkatzelis [18] , but there are many challenges that need to be overcome for non-separable valuations.
First, to guarantee a bounded approximation factor in the final rounding step, we introduce earning limits into the resulting Fisher market. For additive valuations, this creates a market with a convex set of equilibria. For budget-additive valuations, where we have earning and utility limits, we show that the set of market equilibria can be non-convex. Hence, in contrast to the additive case, the toolbox for solving convex programs (e.g., ellipsoid [17] or scaling algorithms [8, 18] ) is not directly applicable for computing an equilibrium. Instead, we design a new algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium. Based on a constant ε > 0, it perturbs the valuations and rounds the parameters v ij up to the next power of (1 + ε). Then it computes an exact equilibrium of the perturbed market in polynomial time, which represents an approximate equilibrium in the original market. This yields a novel FPTAS for markets with earning and utility limits, which might be of independent interest.
To compute an exact equilibrium in the perturbed market, we first obtain an equilibrium (prices p, allocation x) of a market that results from ignoring all utility caps [9, 17] . This is not an equilibrium of the market with both caps, because some buyers may be overspending. Let the surplus of a buyer be the money spent minus the money needed to earn the optimal utility, and similarly let the surplus of a good be the target earning minus the actual earning. Let S be the set of buyers who have positive surplus at prices p. Our idea is to pick a buyer, say k, in S and decrease the prices of goods in a coordinated fashion. The goal is to make k's surplus zero while maintaining the surpluses of all goods and all buyers not in S to be zero. We show that after a polynomial number of iterations of price decrease, either the surplus of buyer k becomes zero or we discover a good with price 0 in equilibrium. Picking a particular buyer is crucial in the analysis, because we rely on this buyer to show that a certain parameter strictly decreases. This implies substantial price decrease of goods and polynomial running time.
Given such an exact equilibrium wrt. perturbed valuations, we provide a new rounding algorithm that turns the fractional equilibrium allocation into an integral one. While the algorithm exploits a tree structure of the equilibrium allocation as in [18] , the rounding must be much more careful to correctly treat agents that reach their utility caps in the equilibrium. In particular, we first conduct several initial assignment steps to arrive at a solution where we have a set of rooted trees on agents and items, and each item j has exactly one child agent i who gets at least half of its fractional valuation from j. In the main step of the rounding algorithm, we need to ensure that the root agent r receives one of its child items. Here we pick a child item j that generates the most value for r. A problem arises at the child agent i of j, since r receiving j could decrease i's valuation by a lot more than a factor of 2. Recursively, we again need to enforce an allocation for the root agent, thereby "stealing" fractional value from one of its grandchildren agents. This approach may seem hopeless to yield any reasonable approximation guarantee, but we show that overall the agents only suffer by a small constant factor.
Our analysis of this rounding procedure provides a new lower bound on the Nash social welfare obtained by the algorithm, which is complemented with a novel upper bound on the optimum solution. Both bounds crucially exploit the properties of agents (goods) that reach the utility (earning) caps in the market equilibrium. These bounds imply an approximation factor of 2e 1/(2e) < 2.404. Since the equilibrium conditions apply wrt. perturbed valuations, we obtain a (2e 1/(2e) + ε)-approximation in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0.
Related Work The Nash social welfare is a classic objective for allocation of goods to agents. It was proposed by Nash [37] for the bargaining problem as the unique objective that satisfies a collection of natural axioms. Since then it has received significant attention in the literature on social choice and fair division (see, e.g. [13, 19, 28, 40] for a subset of notable recent work, and the references therein).
For indivisible items and general non-negative valuations, the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare is hard to approximate within any finite factor [38] . For additive valuations, the problem is APX-hard [32] , and efficient 2-approximation algorithms based on market equilibrium [17, 18] and stable polynomials [1, 2] exist. These algorithms have been extended to give a 2-approximation also in markets with multiple copies per item [9] and separable concave valuations [2] .
For divisible items, the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare is solved by competitive equilibria with equal incomes (CEEI) [36] . These equilibria often can be computed by solving convex programs due to Eisenberg and Gale [25] or Shmyrev [42] . For additive valuations, there are combinatorial [21] and even strongly polynomial-time algorithms [39, 45] for computing such an equilibrium.
Unfortunately, even for additive valuations CEEI can be exponentially more valuable than optimal solutions for indivisible items. To obtain an improved bound on the indivisible optimum, Cole and Gkatzelis [18] introduced and rounded spending-restricted equilibria with earning caps for every good. More generally, equilibria in markets with earning limits are described by a convex program [17] . They can be computed and rounded efficiently to obtain a 2-approximation for additive valuations and any number of indivisible items [9] .
Budget-additive valuations are a popular class of submodular valuation functions, especially due to applications in online advertising [33] . They are additive valuations with a global limit, which makes the valuation non-separable. These utility limits have been recently proposed and studied in Fisher markets, and the equilibria are described by a convex program [8, 17] . An equilibrium in these markets can be computed using algorithms for concave generalized flows [44] , the set of equilibria forms a lattice, and equilibria with maximum or minimum prices can also be obtained efficiently [8] .
Preliminaries
Nash Social Welfare There is a set B of n agents and a set G of m indivisible items, where we assume m ≥ n. We allocate the items to the agents, and we represent an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) using a characteristic vector x S with x S ij = 1 iff j ∈ S i and 0 otherwise. Agent i ∈ B has a value v ij ≥ 0 for item j and a global utility cap c i > 0. The budget-additive valuation of agent i for an allocation S of items is v i (x S i ) = min c i , j∈G v ij x S ij . The goal is to find an allocation that approximates the optimal Nash social welfare, i.e., the optimal geometric mean of valuations max S i∈B
Our approximation algorithm in Section 3 relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium for a linear Fisher market with earning and utility limits.
Fisher Markets with Earning and Utility Limits In such a market there is a set B of n buyers and a set G of m divisible goods. Each good is owned by a separate seller and comes in unit supply. Each buyer i ∈ B has a value u ij ≥ 0 for a unit of good j ∈ G and an endowment m i ≥ 0 of money. Suppose buyer i receives a bundle of goods x i = (x ij ) j∈G with x ij ∈ [0, 1], then the utility function is
The vector x = (x i ) i∈B with i∈B x ij = 1 for every j ∈ G denotes a (fractional) allocation of goods to buyers. For an allocation, we call i a capped buyer if u i (x i ) = c i . We also maintain a vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) of prices for the goods. Given such prices p, a demand bundle x * i of buyer i is a bundle of goods that maximizes the utility of buyer i for its budget, i.e., x * i ∈ arg max u i (x i ) | j p j x ij ≤ m i . For price vector p and buyer i, we use λ i = min j p j /u ij and denote by α i = 1/λ i the maximum bangper-buck (MBB) ratio (where we assume 0/0 = 0). Given prices p and allocation x, the money flow f ij from buyer i to seller j is given by f ij = p j x ij . If price p j > 0, then x ij uniquely determines f ij and vice versa.
For the sellers, let
An optimal supply e * j allows seller j to obtain the highest utility, i.e., e * j ∈ arg max {u j (e j , p j ) | e j ≤ 1}. We consider three natural properties for allocation and supply vectors:
1. An allocation x i for buyer i is called modest if j u ij x ij ≤ c i . By definition, for uncapped buyers every demand bundle is modest. For capped buyers, a modest bundle of goods x i is such that
2. A demand bundle x i is called thrifty or MBB if it consists only of MBB goods:
For uncapped buyers every demand bundle is MBB.
Given a set of prices, a thrifty and modest demand bundle for buyer i minimizes the amount of money required to obtain optimal utility. A modest supply for seller j minimizes the amount of supply required to obtain optimal utility in equilibrium. Our interest lies in market equilibria that have thrifty and modest demands and modest supply. Note that they also emerge when earning and utility caps are not satiation points but limits in the form of hard constraints on the utility in equilibrium (c.f. [17] ).
Definition 2.1 (Thrifty and Modest Equilibrium).
A thrifty and modest (market) equilibrium is a pair (x, p), where x is an allocation and p a vector of prices such that the following conditions hold: (1) p ≥ 0 (prices are nonnegative), (2) e j is a modest supply for every j ∈ G, (3) x j ≤ e j for every j ∈ G (no overallocation), (4) x i is a thrifty and modest demand bundle for every i ∈ B, and (5) Walras' law holds: p j (e j − x j ) = 0 for every j ∈ G.
Note that in equilibrium, if x j < e j , then p j = 0. Moreover, we assume that all parameters of the market u ij , c i , d j and m i for all i ∈ B and j ∈ G are non-negative integers. Let U = max i∈B,j∈G {u ij , m i , c i , d j } be the largest integer in the representation of the market.
Consider the following condition termed money clearing: For each subset of buyers and the goods these buyers are interested in, there must be a feasible allocation of the buyer money that does not violate the earning caps. More formally, letB ⊆ B be a set of buyers, and N (B) = {j ∈ G | u ij > 0 for some i ∈B} be the set of goods such that there is at least one buyer inB with positive utility for the good.
Definition 2.2 (Money Clearing). A market is money clearing if
When there are only earning limits, money clearing is a precise characterization of markets that have thrifty and modest equilibria [9] . For markets with both limits, it is sufficient for existence (see Section 4.1).
Perturbed Markets Our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes a thrifty and modest equilibrium in a perturbed marketM.
Definition 2.3 (Perturbed Utility, Perturbed Market). For a market M and a parameter ε > 0, the perturbed utility of buyer i is given byũ
The perturbed marketM is exactly the market M where every buyer i ∈ B has perturbed utilitiesũ i .
In Section 4.2 we observe that an exact equilibrium inM represents an ε-approximate equilibrium for the unperturbed market M. Moreover, given an exact equilibrium ofM, rounding this equilibrium to an integral assignment deteriorates the approximation factor of our algorithm for the Nash social welfare only by a small constant (see Section 3.3).
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare
In this section, we present a (2e 1/(2e) + ε)-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations, for every constant ε > 0.
If v ij ≥ c i , we can equivalently assume that v ij = c i since the valuation can be at most c i .
The following lemma is straightforward and its proof is omitted.
Henceforth, we will assume that v ij ≤ c i , for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G. We relate our problem to a Fisher market M with earning and utility limits in a direct way -in M, we have a buyer i for each agent i and a divisible good j for each item j. For each buyer i the budget m i = 1, u ij = v ij , and c i is the utility cap. Further, we assume that each good j comes in unit supply, and its earning cap is d j = 1.
Lemma 3.2. If the market M is not money clearing, then the maximum Nash social welfare for indivisible items is 0.
Proof. Obviously, if market M is not money clearing, then there exists a subset B ′ of buyers such that the sum of earning caps of goods in Γ(B ′ ) = {j | v ij > 0, i ∈ B ′ } is less than the sum of budgets of buyers in B ′ . This implies that |Γ(B ′ )| < |B ′ |. Hence, there is no allocation where each agent in B ′ gets at least one item of positive valuation. Thus, the Nash social welfare must always be 0.
When the market is not money clearing, every allocation has the optimal Nash social welfare. It is easy to check condition (1) by a max-flow computation. We therefore assume that our instance satisfies it. We show in Section 4.1 that a money-clearing market M always has a thrifty and modest equilibrium.
Suppose we are given such an equilibrium (x, p). Our subsequent analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 shows how to obtain a 2e 1/(2e) -approximation for the Nash social welfare based on any such equilibrium. In Section 3.3 we provide a guarantee for rounding an equilibrium of the perturbed market, which can be computed in polynomial time (see Section 4.2).
The Nash social welfare objective allows scaling the valuation function of every agent i by any factor γ i > 0. This does neither change the optimum solution nor the approximation factor. Our first aim is to normalize the valuation function for agent i based on the MBB ratio α i of buyer i in the market equilibrium (x, p).
In equilibrium, there can be a set of goods G 0 = {j | p j = 0}. All buyers B 0 = {i | j ∈ G 0 , u ij > 0} interested in any good j ∈ G 0 have infinite MBB ratio. Due to our equilibrium conditions, every i ∈ B 0 must be capped and receive allocation only from G 0 , i.e., u i (x) = c i and x ij > 0 only if j ∈ G 0 and u ij > 0. Moreover, since no buyer i ∈ B \ B 0 has positive utility for any of the goods G 0 , these goods are allocated only to B 0 . Therefore, we can treat items G 0 and agents B 0 separately in the analysis.
For all i ∈ B \ B 0 , we normalize v ′ ij = v ij /α i and c ′ i = c i /α i . This does not change the demand bundle for buyer i, and thus (x, p) remains an equilibrium. In the resulting instance, every such buyer has MBB of 1 in (x, p). Consequently, v ′ ij ≤ p j for all i ∈ B \ B 0 , j ∈ G, where equality holds if and only if j is an MBB good of buyer i. For simplicity we assume that v and c fulfill these conditions directly, i.e., v ij = v ′ ij and c i = c ′ i . Together with the fact that v ij ≤ c i , ∀(i, j) this implies
Moreover, the following lemma is a helpful insight on the structure of equilibria. Proof. Suppose i is a capped buyer with MBB good j and p j > 1. Then our scaling implies that the MBB ratio is 1, and thus 1 = v ij /p j < v ij ≤ c i . Since the budget of i is 1, its maximum utility is 1 < c i , which is a contradiction.
Upper Bound
In this section, we obtain an upper bound on the optimal Nash social welfare when valuations are normalized based on an equilibrium (x, p). The bound relates to prices and utility caps of the capped buyers in (x, p). We denote by B c and B u the set of capped and uncapped buyers in (x, p), respectively. Recall that since (x, p) is a thrifty and modest equilibrium, buyers may not spend their entire budget and sellers may not sell their entire supply. We denote by m a i = min(m i , c i /α i ) the active budget of buyer i where α i is the MBB ratio of buyer i at prices p, and by p a j = min(p j , d j ) the active price of good j. The following result is a generalization of a similar bound shown in [18] . The main difference is to carefully account for the contribution of capped buyers. 
, where x * is an integral allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare.
Proof. Consider the equilibrium (x, p). For the agents i ∈ B 0 ⊆ B c , a simple upper bound is i∈B 0 v i (x * ) ≤ i∈B 0 c i . For the rest of the proof, we consider the remaining agents B \ B 0 . Due to our scaling to MBB of 1, every capped i ∈ B c \ B 0 has c i = v i (x) = m a i ≤ 1, whereas every uncapped i ∈ B u has c i > v i (x) = m a i = 1. Market clearing implies i∈Bc\B 0
Now consider an integral allocation x * that maximizes the Nash social welfare. To obtain an upper bound on i∈B\B 0 v i (x * ), we can assume for the rest of this proof that all inequalities (3) are tight, i.e., v ij = min(c i , p j ) for all (i, j). This implies that i∈B\B 0 v i (x * ) ≤ j∈G p j . We denote by G c be the set of goods allocated to agents in B c \ B 0 in x * . Again, due to (3), we have i∈Bc\B
} be the set of items with price more than 1 that are assigned in x * to buyers in B u . Let
To obtain an upper bound on i∈B\B 0 v i (x * ), we now take a fractional improvement step and relax the integrality condition on x * for buyers in B \ (B 1 u ∪ B 0 ). We take goods assigned to B 1 u in x * and fractionally allocate them to buyers in B \ (B 1 u ∪ B 0 ). Moreover, we take the goods assigned to B \ (B 1 u ∪ B 0 ) and redistribute them fractionally among these buyers. However, we require that the fractional solution respects the upper bound (5). We denote byx the best solution obtained in this improvement step. Note that the Nash social welfare can only increase.
Recall that c i ≤ 1 for every capped buyer i ∈ B c \ B 0 , so v i (x) ≤ c i ≤ 1. Further, since no good j ∈ G c can give value more than 1 to any buyer in B c \ B 0 , we have i∈Bc\B 0
x satisfies (5), so we obtain i∈Bu\B 1
. Now in order to maximize i∈B\B 0 v i (x), we assume that each buyer in B u \ B 1 u gets equal value. This implies
Further, recall that each buyer in i ∈ B 1 u gets at least one good j with price p j > 1 in x * . Since
u . Next we observe that the maximum value for i∈B\B 0 v i (x) is obtained when each buyer i ∈ B c \B 0 gets value c i , each buyer i ∈ B 1 u gets exactly one good of G 1 u , i.e., |B 1 u | = |G 1 u |, and each buyer i ∈ B u \B 1 u gets value 1. This will prove the claim. Suppose atx, some (hence, by assumption, each) buyer in B u \ B 1 u receives value more than 1, then (7) 
. This increases the Nash social welfare, which is a contradiction.
Rounding Equilibria
In this section, we give an algorithm to round a fractional allocation of a thrifty and modest equilibrium (x, p) to an integral one. W.l.o.g., we may assume that the allocation graph (B ∪ G, E) with E = {{i, j} ∈ B × G | x ij > 0} is a forest [24, 39] . In the following, we only discuss how to round the trees in (B \ B 0 ) × (G \ G 0 ). For trees in B 0 × G 0 , the rounding and the analysis are very similar, but independent of prices and slightly simpler (see Appendix A). Consider the following procedure:
Preprocessing: For each tree component of the allocation graph, assign some agent to be a root node. For each good that has no child-agent, assign it to its parent agent. For each good j, if it has two or more child agents, then keep only one child agent who buys the largest amount of j. For every other child agent i, delete the edge (i, j) and make i the root node of the newly created tree. For each good j, if its price is at most half of the active budget of its child-agent i, i.e., p j ≤ m a i /2, then assign j to its parent agent and make the child agent i the root node of a newly created tree.
Rounding: For each tree component, do the following recursively: Assign the root agent a child-good j that gives him the maximum value (among all children goods) in the fractional solution. Except in the subtree rooted at j, assign each good to its child-agent in the remaining tree. Make the child-agent of good j the root node of the newly created tree. Proof. The first part is straightforward since after preprocessing, every remaining good has exactly one parent agent and one child agent. For the second part, whenever an agent loses allocation, a new tree component is being created, and we make this agent its root node. Since v ij ≤ c i , ∀(i, j), each capped agent needs to buy in total at least one unit of goods and each uncapped agent spends his entire budget. If a child agent i is cut off from a good j, then either x ij ≤ 1/2 or p j ≤ m a i /2. In the latter case, the maximum utility of good j for agent i is at most half of its active budget. In the former case, if i is capped,
Proof. Consider any good j in the tree in the rounding step. Since j was not assigned to its parent agent during preprocessing, we know its price is at least half of the active budget of its child agent. Hence, from this good the child agent obtains a valuation of at least half of the valuation in the equilibrium.
Consider a tree T at the beginning of the rounding step with k T + 1 agents and k T goods. Let  a 1 , g 1 , a 2 , g 2 , . . . , a l , g l , a l+1 be the recursion path in T starting from the root agent a 1 and ending at the leaf agent a l+1 such that a 1 , . . . , a l+1 became root agents of the trees formed recursively during the rounding step, and good g i is assigned to a i in this process, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We denote by k i the number of children for agent a i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Lemma 3.6. The product of the valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution is at least
Proof. First assume that all prices are at most 1, which implies that all goods are fully sold. Let c i = min{1, c i }, ∀i ∈ B. Let q i = x a i ,g i be the amount of good g i bought by agent a i in the equilibrium, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Clearly, l j=1 k j ≤ k. Using Lemma 3.4 and the fact that the rounding assigns a child good that gives the maximum value in the fractional solution to the root agent, the value obtained by a 1 in the rounded solution is at leastc 1 2q 1 k 1 ; note that the child contributes at leastc 1 /(2k 1 ) to the utility of the root and assigning the good completely will multiply this by 1/q 1 . Since v ij ≤ min{c i , p j }, ∀(i, j) and p j ≤ 1, we note thatc 1 2q 1 k 1 ≤c 1 , so this is indeed a feasible lower bound on the valuation achieved by the root agent.
Due to the assignment of g 1 to a 1 , a 2 loses at mostc 2 (1 − q 1 ) value, but he still gets at leastc 2 q 1 value from other goods. Hence, similarly, assigning g 2 to a 2 in the rounded solution, a 2 gets value at leastc 2 q 1 q 2 k 2 . Again, this represents a number less thanc 2 and hence a feasible lower bound on the valuation of a 2 . Continuing in this way, we obtain that in the rounded solution, a i gets value at least
for 2 ≤ i ≤ l, and a l+1 gets value at leastc l+1 q l . Using Lemma 3.5, each of the remaining k − l agents in T get a value at least v i (x)/2. This implies that the product of valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution is at least
Next we remove the assumption that all prices are at most 1. Consider a good j such that p j > 1. Using Lemma 3.3, it can be only assigned to an uncapped agent i during the rounding. Further since p j = v ij ≤ c i , the value of agent i with this allocation is at least p j . Finally, since at most one good is assigned to each agent during the rounding step, each capped good is assigned to a separate agent, and hence the product of the valuations of agents in T in the rounded solution is at least
Theorem 3.2. The rounding procedure gives a 2e 1/2e -approximation for the optimal Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations, where 2e 1/2e < 2.404.
Proof. Suppose there are trees T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T a at the beginning of the rounding. Let k i + 1 and k i be the number of agents and goods in tree T i , respectively. Let l i + 1 be the number of agents on the path in T i traced during the rounding step, and let k i 1 , . . . , k i l i be the degrees of the number of children goods for agents along that path.
The bound in Lemma 3.6 for trees T ⊆ (B \ B 0 ) × (G \ G 0 ) can also be obtained for our rounding of trees T ⊆ B 0 × G 0 (Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). Thus, the Nash social welfare of the rounded solution is at least
where the first inequality follows from i (k i + 1) ≤ n and i j k i j ≤ ( i j k i j / i l i ) i l i , and the second inequality uses a i=1 l i j=1 k i j ≤ n and the fact that (2x) x is minimum at x = 1/2e.
Rounding Equilibria of Perturbed Markets
Given a parameter ε ′ > 0, our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes an exact equilibrium for a perturbed market, which results when agents have perturbed valuationsṽ i (x) = min c i , jṽ ij x ij with the same caps c i andṽ ij ≥ v ij ≥ṽ ij /(1 + ε ′ ). Suppose we apply our rounding algorithm to the exact equilibrium forṽ. It obtains an allocation S such that
Given a constant ε ′′ > 0, we apply the FPTAS with ε ′ = ε ′′ /n. This yields an approximation ratio of at most 2e 1/2e e ε ′′ = 2e 1/2e + ε, for some constant ε > 0. We summarize our main result:
Corollary 3.1. For every ε > 0 there is an algorithm with running time polynomial in n, m, log max i,j {v ij , c i }, and 1/ε that computes an allocation which represents a (2e 1/2e + ε)-approximation for the optimal Nash social welfare.
Computing Equilibria

Existence and Structure of Equilibria
Thrifty and modest equilibria in markets with utility and earning limits have interesting and nontrivial structure. For markets with utility limits, such an equilibrium always exists [8] . For markets with earning limits, such an equilibrium may not exist, because uncapped buyers always spend all their money. In these markets, the money-clearing condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium [9] (see also [17] for the case that u ij > 0 for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G). We observe that in a market M with both limits, money clearing is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium. Our FPTAS below gives an ε-approximate equilibrium in money-clearing markets, for arbitrarily small ε. Since market parameters are finite integers, for sufficiently small ε this implies existence of an exact equilibrium. This is interesting since the structure of equilibria in such markets can be quite complex. For example, in money-clearing markets M there can be no convex program describing thrifty and modest equilibria. This holds even if we restrict to the ones that are Pareto-optimal with respect to the set of all thrifty and modest equilibria. Equilibria for the corresponding markets without caps, or with either earning or utility caps might not remain equilibria in the market with both sets of caps. Hence, existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium in money-clearing markets M follows neither from a convex program nor by a direct application of existing algorithms for markets with only one set of either utility or earning caps. The following proposition summarizes our observations. Proof. We provide an example market for each of the three properties.
Property 1: Consider a linear market with one buyer and one good. The buyer has m 1 = 2, utility u 11 = 2, and utility cap c 1 = 1. The good has earning cap d 1 = 1. The unique thrifty and modest equilibrium has price p 1 = 2 and allocation x 11 = 1/2. Both seller and buyer exactly reach their cap. The active budget m a i = 1 equals the earning cap. Conversely, due to price 2, the supply is 1, for which the achieved utility equals the utility cap. Note that condition (1) If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium has prices (1, 10) and buyer utilities (1, 1). If we ignore the utility caps and consider only earning caps, the equilibrium prices are (5y, 50y) and buyer utilities are ( 1 /5y, 1 /5y), for y ≥ 1. If we ignore the earning caps and consider only utility caps, the equilibrium prices are (1, x) and buyer utilities are (1, 1) , for x ∈ [3, 10] .
With all caps, the equilibria form two disjoint convex sets: either prices (1, x) and buyer utilities (1, 1), for x ∈ [3, 6]; or prices (5y, 50y) and buyer utilities ( 1 /5y, 1 /5y), for y ≥ 1. Note that (1, x) for x ∈ (6, 10] are not equilibrium prices, since this would violate the earning cap of seller 2.
Observe that there are exactly two Pareto-optimal equilibria: prices (1, 6) (which also represents income for the sellers) and buyer utilities (1, 1); and prices (5, 50) (with income (3, 6) for the sellers) and buyer utilities ( 1 /5, 1 /5). The first equilibrium is strictly better for both buyers, the second one strictly better for seller 1. If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (55.5, 55.5). If we ignore the buyer caps and consider only seller caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (102, 102). If we ignore the seller caps and consider only buyer caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (10, 10) . For both buyer and seller caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (20, 20) .
Computing Equilibria in Perturbed Markets
In this section, we analyze Algorithm 1 for computing an approximate equilibrium in money-clearing markets M. Recall that the input is u ij , m i , c i , d j , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, where u ij is the utility derived by buyer i for a unit amount of good j, m i is the budget of buyer i, c i is the utility cap of buyer i, and d j is the earning cap of seller j. For any ε > 0, Algorithm 1 computes an exact equilibrium in a perturbed marketM, where we increase every non-zero parameter u ij to the next-larger power of (1 + ε).
Algorithm 1. FPTAS for M with Earning and Utility Caps
Input : Market M given by budgets m i , utility caps c i , earning caps d j , utilities u ij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, approximation parameter ε; Output: Equilibrium (x, p) of the perturbed marketM 1 ConstructM, setŨ ← max ijũij , and run the rest of the algorithm on this perturbed market 2 (f , p) ← equilibrium ofM when ignoring all utility caps 3 Z ← {i ∈ B | s(i) = 0} // set of zero surplus buyers
22 Assign x i according to f for all buyers i ∈ B that have not been assigned yet. 23 return (x, p) Additional Concepts Our algorithm steers prices and flow towards equilibrium by monitoring the surplus of buyers and sellers. Note that a buyer i is capped if m i α i ≥ c i .
Definition 4.1 (Active Budget, Active Price, Surplus). Given prices p and money flow f , the active budget of buyer i is m a i = min(m i , c i /α i ), the active supply of seller j is e a j = min(1, d j /p j ), and the active price is p a j = p j e a j = min(p j , d j ). The surplus of buyer i is s(i) = j∈G f ij − m a i , and the surplus of good j is s(j) = p a j − i∈B f ij .
Several graphs connected to the MBB ratio are useful here. As argued in [24, 39] , we can assume w.l.o.g. that the MBB graph is non-degenerate, i.e., it is a forest. Let us also define a reverse flow network N − (p, Z) by adding a sink t to the the MBB graph. The network has nodes G ∪ B ∪ {t}, edges (i, t) for i ∈ B \ Z, and the reverse MBB edges (j, i) if (i, j) is an MBB edge. All edges have infinite capacity. The supply at node j ∈ G is p a j , demand at node i ∈ B is m a i , and demand at node t is j p a j − i m a i . The flow in the network corresponds to money. Given
Algorithm 2. MinFactor
Input : Prices p, flow f , set of buyersB, set of goodsĜ, set of zero-surplus buyers Z Output: Minimum price decrease consistent with the input configuration 1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p betweenB andĜ 2 G c ← Set of goods fromĜ that are capped at (f , p) 3 B c ← Set of buyers fromB that are capped at (f , p) 4 λ i ← min k∈G p k /u ik , ∀i ∈B 5 Set up the following LP in flow variables g and x:
min
return Optimal solution x of above LP a money flow f in the network N − (p, Z), the surplus of buyer i ∈ B \ Z corresponds to flow on (i, t)
Buyers in Z do not have edges to the sink. Hence, their surplus is fixed to 0 at every feasible flow.
Algorithm and Analysis Algorithm 1 computes an exact equilibrium ofM. For convenience, it maintains a money flow f . For goods with non-zero price, f is equivalent to an allocation x. When the algorithm encounters a set of goods with price 0, the buyers interested in these goods must be capped, and the algorithm determines a suitable allocation for them by solving a system of linear equations. The algorithm first calls a subroutine to compute a market equilibrium ignoring the utility caps of the buyers. Such an equilibrium exists because the market is money-clearing, can be computed in polynomial time [9, 17] , and consists of a pair (f , p) of flow and prices such that the outflow of every good j is p a j and the inflow of every buyer i is m i . Given this equilibrium, the algorithm then initializes Z to the set of buyers with surplus is zero in (f , p).
The following Invariants are maintained during the run of Algorithm 1:
• no price ever increases.
• if s(i) = 0 for a buyer i, it remains 0. Z is monotonically increasing.
• N − (p, Z) allows a feasible flow, i.e., s(i) ≥ 0 for every buyer i ∈ B and s(j) = 0 for every good j ∈ G.
More formally, the algorithm uses a descending-price approach. There is always a flow in N − (p, Z) with outflow of a good j ∈ G equal to p a j , in-flow into buyer i ∈ B ∩ Z equal to m a i , and in-flow into buyer i ∈ B \ Z at least m a i . Descending prices imply that if a good (buyer) becomes uncapped (capped), it remains uncapped (capped).
The algorithm ends when Z = B, i.e., all buyers have surplus zero, and hence (f , p) is an equilibrium ofM. In the body of the outer while-loop, we first pick a buyer k whose surplus is positive. The inner while loop ends when either the surplus of k becomes zero or the minimum positive price of a good, say ℓ, is at most 1/nŨ n , whereŨ is the maximum parameter value of the perturbed utilities. In the former case, the size of Z increases (in line 21). In the latter case, we obtain a setĜ of goods connected to ℓ through MBB edges and a setB of buyers who have non-zero utility for some good inĜ. Since the price of each good inĜ is so low and their surplus is zero, each buyer inB must be capped. Hence we fix the allocation of buyers inB according to the current money flow f , and set the prices of all goods inĜ and surplus of all buyers inB to zero. Since the algorithm maintains goods with price 0 and buyers with surplus 0, the inner-while loop is executed at most m + n times.
In the body of inner while-loop, we construct the setB of buyers andĜ of goods that can reach buyer k in the MBB residual graph (see Definition 4.2). We then continuously decrease the prices of all goods inĜ by a common factor x, starting from x = 1. This may destroy MBB edges connecting buyers inB with goods in G \Ĝ. However, by definition ofĜ there is no flow on such edges. For uncapped goods inĜ (capped buyers inB), this decreases the active price (budget) by a factor of x. We stop if one of the two events happens: (1) a new MBB edge appears, and (2) x is equal to the minimum factor possible that allows a feasible flow with the current MBB edges, i.e., in-flow into a good j ∈Ĝ is equal to p a j , out-flow of a buyer inB ∩ Z is equal to m a i , and out-flow of a buyer in B \ Z is at least m a i . While the value of x for event (1) results from ratios ofũ ij , the value of x for event (2) is found by Algorithm 2 based on a linear program (LP). Observe that the flow f and x = 1 are a feasible initial solution for the LP.
After the event happened, we update to a new feasible flow f using Algorithm 3. For prices p and the set Z of zero-surplus buyers, the in-flow into a good j ∈ G must be equal to p a j , out-flow of a buyer in Z must be equal to m a i , and out-flow of a buyer in B \ Z must be at least m a i . Algorithm 3 sets up a feasibility LP to find such a feasible flow. Observe that this feasibility set is non-empty due to Event 2.
The following lemma is straightforward, we omit the proof. Next we bound the running time of Algorithm 1. Event 1 provides a new MBB edge between a buyer in B \B and a good inĜ. Event 2 restricts the price decrease in x such that the Invariants are maintained. The event happens only if (1) at the value of x there is a subset of buyers S ⊆B such that i∈S m a i = j∈Γ(S) p a j , where Γ(S) is the set of goods to which buyers in S have MBB edges, and (2) further decrease of prices would make the total active budget of buyers in S more than the total active prices of Γ(S). This condition would violate the invariant that N − (p, Z) has a feasible flow where the surplus of each good is zero. If the subset S is equal toB or S contains buyer k, then the surplus of k in every feasible flow is zero at such a minimum x, and hence the inner-while loop ends. Otherwise, the MBB edges between buyers in B \ S and goods in Γ(S) will become non-MBB in the next iteration. So in each event of the inner-while loop, either a new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes. Next, we show that for a given buyer k, the total number of iterations of the inner-while loop is polynomially bounded. For this, we first show that price of a good strictly decreases during each iteration of inner-while loop.
Lemma 4.2. In each iteration of inner-while loop, the MBB ratio of buyer k strictly increases.
Proof. Each iteration of the inner while-loop ends with one of the two events. Clearly, Event 1 can occur only when the prices of goods inĜ strictly decrease, and this implies that the MBB of buyer k strictly increases. In case of Event 2, as argued above, there is a subset S ⊆B of buyers such that i∈S m a i = j∈Γ(S) p a j , where Γ(S) is the set of goods to which S have MBB edges. If k ∈ S, then s(k) = 0 in this iteration. This implies that i∈S m a i < j∈Γ(S) p a j at the beginning of this iteration, and since equality emerges, prices must have strictly decreased and the MBB of k strictly increased. If k ∈ S, then S =B and flow on all MBB edges fromB \ S to Γ(S) has become zero. Note that there is at least one such edge due to the construction ofB andĜ. Using the fact that there was a non-zero flow on these edges and i∈S m a i < j∈Γ(S) p a j at the beginning of this iteration, we conclude that prices of goods must have strictly decreased and the MBB of k strictly increased.
Next we show that the price of a good substantially decreases after a certain number of iterations. For this, we partition the iterations into phases, where every phase has n 2 iterations of the inner while-loop. Proof. Due to Lemma 4.1, we have p ′ j ≤ p j , ∀j ∈ G. For the second part, note thatB always contains buyer k during an entire run of inner while-loop. Since prices monotonically decrease, the MBB α k of buyer k monotonically increases. Further, if there is a MBB path from buyer k to a good j, then we have, for some (
In each iteration, either a new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes. When a new MBB edge evolves, a new MBB path from buyer k to a good j gets established. When an existing MBB edge vanishes, then an old MBB path from k to a good j gets destroyed. Further, if there is an MBB path from a good j to buyer k, then price of good j monotonically decreases. If there is no MBB path from a good j to buyer k, then price of good j does not decrease. After n 2 events, there has to be a good j such that initially there is an MBB path from k to j, then no MBB path between them for some iterations, then again an MBB path between them. Let p j be the price of good j at the time when there is no path between k and j, and let α k and α ′ k be the MBB for buyer k at the time the MBB path between j and k was broken and when it was later again established, respectively. Since p j does not change unless there is a path between k and j, we have
for some integers c 1 and c 2 .
. Let good l give the MBB to buyer k at α ′ k , and let p l and p ′ l be the prices of good l when the MBB path between j and k was broken and when it was later established. This implies
Lemma 4.4. The number of iterations of the inner while-loop is in O(n 3 log 1+ε (nŨ n i m i )).
Proof. From Lemma 4.3, in each phase the price of a good decreases by a factor of (1 + ε). The number of iterations in a phase is O(n 2 ). The starting price is at most i m i . If a price becomes at most 1/nŨ n , the inner while-loop ends for a particular buyer k. Hence, the number of phases is at most n log 1+ε nŨ n i m i , and the number of iterations of the inner while-loop is at most O(n 3 log 1+ε nŨ n i m i ). Since (x, p) is an exact equilibrium ofM, the MBB condition implies that x ij > 0 only ifũ ij /p j = max k∈Gũik /p k . Further, using (2) we getα i (1+ε) > α i , ∀i. This implies thatũ
In addition, since (x, p) is an exact equilibrium forM, we obtain i x ij = min{1, p a j /p j }, ∀{j ∈ G | p j > 0} and i x ij ≤ 1, ∀{j ∈ G | p j = 0}. This proves the claim. 
Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we provide a result on the hardness of approximation of the maximum Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations. The best previous bound was a factor of 1.00008 for the special case of additive valuations [32] . Our improved lower bound of 8/7 > 1.069 follows by adapting a construction in [15] for (sum) social welfare, Theorem 5.1. There is no 8/7-approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations unless P=NP.
Proof. Chakrabarty and Goel [15] show hardness for (sum) social welfare by reducing from MAX-E3-LIN-2. An instance of this problem consists of n variables and m linear equations over GF (2) . Each equation consists of 3 distinct variables. For the Nash social welfare objective, we require slightly more control over the behavior of the optimal assignments. Therefore, we consider the stronger problem variant Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2, in which each variable occurs exactly k times in the equations. Our reduction follows the construction in [15] . We only sketch the main properties here. For more details see [15, Section 4] .
For each variable x i we introduce two agents x i : 0 and x i : 1 . Each of these agents has a cap of c i = 4k, where k is the number of occurrences of x i in the equations. Since in E3-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 every variable occurs exactly k times, we have c i = 4k for all agents. Moreover, for each variable x i there is a switch item. The switch item has value 4k for agents x i : 0 and x i : 1 , and value 0 for every other agent. It serves to capture the assignment of the variable -if x i is set to x i = 1, the switch item is given to x i : 0 (for x i = 0, the switch item goes to x i : 1 ). When given a switch item, an agent cannot generate value for any additional equation items defined as follows.
For each equation x i + x j + x k = α with α ∈ {0, 1}, we introduce 4 classes of equation itemsone class for each satisfying assignment. In particular, we get class x i : α; x j : α; x k : α as well as classes x i :ᾱ, x j :ᾱ, x k : α , x i :ᾱ, x j : α, x k :ᾱ and x i : α, x j :ᾱ, x k :ᾱ . For each of these classes, we introduce three items. Hence, for each equation we introduce 12 items in total. An item < x i : α i , x j : α j , x k : α k has a value of 1 for the three agents x i : α i , x j : α j , and x k : α k , and value 0 for every other agent.
It is easy to see that w.l.o.g. every optimal assignment of items to agents assigns all switch items. Hence, every optimal assignment yields some variable assignment for the underlying instance of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2.
Consider an equation x i + x j + x k = α that becomes satisfied by setting the variables (x i , x j , x k ) = (α i , α j , α k ). Then none of the agents x i : α i , x j : α j , and x k : α k gets a switch item, and we can assign exactly 4 equation items to each of these agents (for details see [15] ). Hence, all 12 equation items generate additional value. In particular, it follows that if x i is involved in a satisfied equation, one of its agent gets a switch item, and the other one can receive at least 3 equation items.
Consider an equation x i +x j +x k = α that becomes unsatisfied by setting the variables (x i , x j , x k ) = (α i , α j , α k ). Then for one class of equation items, all agents that value these items have already received switch items (for details see [15] ). This class of items cannot generate additional value. Hence, at most 9 equation items generate additional value. They can assigned to the agents that did not receive switch items such that each agent receives 3 items. In particular, it follows that if x i is involved in an unsatisfied equation, one of its agents gets a switch item, and the other one can receive at least 3 equation items. Hence, we can ensure that in every optimal solution the overall Nash social welfare is never 0.
We now derive a lower bound on the optimal Nash social welfare when (1 − ε)m equations can be satisfied. In this case, we obtain value 4k for n agents that receive the switch items. Moreover, we get an additional total value of 12m(1 − ε) + 9mε generated by the equation items. Note that m = kn/3. We strive to lower bound the Nash social welfare of such an assignment. For this, it suffices to consider the assignment indicated above -for each satisfied equation, all incident agents without switch items get 4 equation items. For each unsatisfied equation, all incident agents without switch items get 3 equation items. To obtain a lower bound on the Nash social welfare, we assume a value of 4k for a maximum of n(1 − ε) agents, while the others get a value of 3k. Therefore, when an assignment of items to agents generates Nash social welfare of more than (4k) n · (4k) n(1−ε) · 3k
we take this as an indicator that at least m(1 − ε) equations can be fulfilled. In contrast, now suppose only (1/2 + ε)m equations can be fulfilled. In this case, we obtain value 4k for n agents that receive the switch items. Moreover, we get an additional total value of at most 12m(1/2+ ε)+ 9m(1/2− ε) = 10.5m + 3εm generated by the equation items. We strive to upper bound the Nash social welfare of such an assignment. For this, we assume that all agents that do not receive a switch item get an equal share of the value generated by equation items, i.e., a share of 3.5k + kε. Therefore, when an assignment of items to agents generates Nash social welfare of less than ((4k) n · (k(3.5 + ε)) n ) −2n = k · 4 we take this as an indicator that at most m(1/2 + ε) equations can be fulfilled. Hence, if we can approximate the optimal Nash social welfare by at most a factor of , we can decide whether the instance of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 has an optimal assignment with at least m(1 − ε) or at most m(1/2 + ε) satisfied equations. This shows that we cannot approximate Nash social welfare with a factor of 8/7 > 1.069 unless P=NP.
